All these concepts were valid then and still resonate today, but the INDOPACOM IAMD Vision 2028 took a revolutionary leap on these tenets. The article emphasized the importance of regional access, praised bilateral IAMD architecture such as we have with Japan, touched briefly on the benefit of a common operating picture (COP) and information and data sharing, and advocated the benefits of training and education with regional allies and partners as provided by the Pacific IAMD Center (PIC). Security cooperation, seen as “Runways and Relationships” and “Places not Bases,” were the catchphrases capturing Pacific Air Forces’ strategic narrative and relationship line of operation with allies and partners, ultimately morphing into the Agile Combat Employment (ACE) concept of today. Significantly, the article highlighted the importance of allies and partners in successfully conducting the IAMD mission. Leading up to this ground-breaking IAMD concept, in 2015, Air & Space Power Journal published an article entitled “Back to the Future: Integrated Air and Missile Defense in the Pacific.” 2 The authors defined IAMD from the US perspective, how we got to where we were at the time, and what “right” looks like in the Pacific. In 2018, INDOPACOM published the IAMD Vision 2028, which is an innovative jump forward in IAMD development for the United States and its allies/partners to maintain a competitive advantage in the region and the topic for this article. To counter China’s A2/AD concept, one line of effort USINDOPACOM focused on is the Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) enterprise, with a once-in-a-generation, revolutionary vision. The combination of these effects extended China’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) range and its ability to affect the area, challenging the United States and US allies’ and partners’ previously uncontested freedom of maneuver in the region. Along with increases in basing and offshore island building, China was also rapidly developing its ballistic missile arsenal, further improving its reach and sphere of influence. 1 This “fourth island chain” drove the USINDOPACOM combatant command name change but was only the opening clutch of China’s rise to power in the region. China also increased its presence in the Indian Ocean with the establishment of its first overseas military base in Doraleh, Djibouti. ![]() Over the first decade and a half of the twenty-first century, China carried out its strategy to counter US power presence within “island chains” in a synchronized, methodical manner by extending its own basing in the South China Sea with manmade islands and inhabiting sovereign territory of neighboring countries. ![]() forces access to the first island chain moreover, Chinese military planners will likely shift their focus of attention to the second island chain. Once China has acquired the capability to deny U.S.
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